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Cover -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Contents -- Glossary of Irish Language Terms -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation, Agreements and Treaties -- 1. Beginnings, Influences and Evolution -- I. Introduction -- II. Irish Constitutional History: 1782 to 1922 -- III. The Irish Free State: 1922-1937 -- IV. Drafting a New Constitution -- V. Overview of the 1937 Constitution -- VI. Constitutional Ideology and Constitutional Balance of Power -- VII. Conclusion -- Further Reading -- 2. Constitutional Foundations -- I. Introduction -- II. People and Nation -- III. Who are the People? -- IV. Territory -- V. The Character of the State -- VI. International Relations -- VII. The European Union -- VIII. Continuing Relations with the UK and Northern Ireland -- IX. Conclusion -- Further Reading -- 3. Government and Oireachtas -- I. Introduction -- II. Party Politics -- III. The Government -- IV. Coalition Governments -- V. The Dáil Electoral System -- VI. Preserving a Fair Electoral Process -- VII. Seanad Éireann -- VIII. The Internal Organisation of the Houses of the Oireachtas -- IX. The Attorney General and Director of Public Prosecutions -- X. Conclusion -- Further Reading -- 4. The President -- I. Introduction -- II. The Election and Removal of the President -- III. The Roles of the President -- IV. The Evolution of the President's Role -- V. Conclusion -- Further Reading -- 5. Legislative Power and Interpretation -- I. Introduction -- II. Preparation of Legislation for the Oireachtas -- III. Passage through the Oireachtas -- IV. Legislative Debate -- V. Constitutional Limits on the Form of Legislation -- VI. The Attorney General as a Veto-holder in the Legislative Process -- VII. The Oireachtas Elected in 2016 -- VIII. The Interpretation of Legislation by the Courts -- IX. Conclusion -- Further Reading.

Northern Ireland challenges a Westphalian account of the world in which sovereign states inhabit discrete geographic spaces. Its constitutional future is not determined by the central UK Government, its external border is porous for people and open for goods, some parts of EU law continue to apply. The paper shifts the focus from unitary and coherent sovereign spaces to multiple, varied and overlapping jural spaces, shedding light on some of the challenges that would be faced in the context of Irish unification. Even in a politically unified Irish state, managing the jural border between Ireland and Northern Ireland would remain a key task. The paper outlines a new account of law's relationship to geographical space, before analysing the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The paper concludes by addressing some structural issues that would need to be addressed if Irish unification were to occur.

PUBLISHED ; In 2015, Ireland became the first country in the world to introduce same-sex marriage by popular referendum. In just 22 years, the country had gone from criminalising sexual activity between men to endorsing same-sex marriage. This result was warmly welcomed by gay rights activists around the world, but some raised concerns over the appropriateness of a referendum as a mechanism for protecting minority rights. One commentator referred to itas an ?indignity,? noting that it was unseemly to put the civil rights of a historically oppressed minority to a popular vote. A proper appraisal of the Irish referendum, however, requires an appreciation its legal and social context. The referendum was held because relevant political actors believed that same-sex marriage required a constitutional amendment, which can only be accomplished by a referendum. The Irish referendum, therefore, cannot be understood as narrowly populist or majoritarian but instead should be seen as part of a consensus-building process required for constitutional amendment. While putting minority votes to a referendum came with costs?most significantly, the public dissection of the private lives of those who stood to benefit from the reform?the required consensus-building also had positive implications for members of the gay community. In short, it produced a much greater level of social acceptance than would likely have been achieved through either judicial or legislative recognition of a right to same-sex marriage. These benefits would likely not have arisen, however, if a referendum had been a choice on the part of political actors rather than a legal necessity. It is therefore unlikely that the Irish experience, whatever its merits, can be straightforwardly translated to other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the Irish referendum campaign yields some lessons for other activist campaigns for same-sex marriage.In particular, I suggest that the storytelling of gay people?and the responses of their fellow citizens?may have been more significant than the articulation of more public values, such as equality.I begin with a brief account of how gay rights developed in Ireland prior to the movement for marriage equality. I then consider the legal arguments that bore on the questions of whether the Constitution either protected a right of same-sex couples to marry or precluded parliament from legislatively introducing same-sex marriage. I then explore the political moves that led to the 2015 referendum before assessing the key features of the referendum campaign, in both its public and private dimensions. I conclude by reviewing the appropriateness of putting minority right to a referendum, before identifying some lessons for political campaigners that arise from the Irish referendum campaign.

Abstract:The judicial use of foreign law in constitutional cases is often unsatisfactorily explained in terms of persuasive authority, judicial learning or judicial dialogue. In this article, I argue that the central case of the judicial use of foreign law involves judges treating foreign case law as theoretically, rather than practically, authoritative. The justification for this approach lies in how case law emerges from a process that is structured in such a way that its outcomes deserve respect. There is, in contrast, no justification for any attempt on the part of judges to treat constitutional cases as an opportunity for interjurisdictional judicial dialogue.